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Abstract
We report 4 cases of Health Workers (HW) suspected of having contracted Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), transported
from the Alliance for International Medical Action (ALIMA) Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC) in N’Zerekore, Guinea to
the Treatment Centre for Carers run by the medical corps of the French army in Conakry, the capital of Guinea, which
was established on 17 January 2015 and closed on 7 July 2015. In total more than 500 HWs have died from EVD since
the epidemic began. This mortality has had significant effects on the ability of local services to respond appropriately
to the disaster. The HWs were transported by air in the “Human Stretcher Transit Isolator-Total Containment (Oxford)
Limited” (HSTI-TCOL) negative pressure isolation pod. Medical evacuation of patients with suspected, potentially fatal,
infectious diseases is feasible with the use of a light isolator for patients without critical dysfunctions.
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Background
West Africa has been ravaged by an epidemic of Ebola virus
disease (EVD) since March 2014. In Guinea, 3700 HWs
have been involved in the fight against Ebola. Viral trans-
mission occurs by direct contact with infected body fluids.
In an EVD outbreak, the key is to isolate and manage af-
fected patients as quickly as possible in an ETC. In West
Africa, 881 HWs had been infected, of whom 513 (58%)
had died [1]. The cumulative incidence of EVD is 21–32
times greater for HWs than the general population [2]. We
report 4 cases of HWs suspected of EVD, transported by
air, the only practical means of transport, from the ETC in
N’Zerekore, Guinea, to the Treatment Centre for Carers
(CTS—Centre de Traitement de Soignants) run by the
French army medical corps in Conakry, with critical care
facilities. The HWs were transported by air in the “Human
Stretcher Transit Isolator-Total Containment (Oxford)
Limited” (HSTI-TCOL) negative pressure isolation pod,
manufactured by TCOL company. Road transport was con-
sidered unsuitable because of the time required (2 days)
and security risks.
Case Number 1: a nurse working in the ETC had con-
tact with numerous patients with EVD in the “high risk
zone” of the ETC without any reported biosafety inci-
dent. She developed profuse diarrhoea, and fever of
38.5C. Given this clinical presentation which is seen in
early EVD [3–5], and the history of contact with patients
infected with Ebola virus, she was managed in isolation.
Examination was unremarkable, without signs of distress.
A peripheral intravenous (IV) cannula was placed, blood
specimens for malaria rapid test and a RT-PCR for Ebola
(reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction, Altona
Diagnostics) were sent to the adjacent laboratory run by
the Belgian Organisation B-FAST (Belgian First Aid and
Support). With her consent, it was decided to evacuate
her to the CTS before the results of the RT-PCR [6].
She was transported to N’Zerekore airport by a dedi-
cated ambulance. She was assisted in entering the isola-
tion pod by two doctors, in full personal protective
equipment (PPE), after the arrival of the evacuation
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helicopter. The United Nations (UN) helicopter provided
by the World Food Program, which was the only aircraft
available arrived at 12:30 AM and took off at 01:30 PM.
In flight, the patient’s temperature rose to 40C. On ar-
rival at the CTS at 5:30 PM, her care was taken over by
the CTS team. Blood results were available on landing in
Conakry; the first PCR for Ebola was negative as was the
rapid test for malaria. PCR 48 h later was also negative.
She was discharged after 3 days with a diagnosis of se-
vere diarrhea, treated with ciprofloxacin.
Case number 2-3-4
These 3 HWs, working in the ETC had no medical his-
tory, and had close contacts, in full PPE, with numerous
patients with EVD. In “the high risk zone”, no biosafety
incident reported.
Case No. 2, a doctor, noted a fever of 38.5C with a
lumbar and low thoracic pain. She was very nauseous
and her temperature rose to 38.9C in flight. The rapid
test of malaria (HRP2), the first RT-PCR and subsequently
48 h were negative. The diagnostic was right lower lobe
pneumonia. She left the CTS on oral amoxicillin/
clavulanic acid therapy after 48 h of IV ceftriaxone,
and oral ciprofloxacin.
Case No. 3, a nurse, presented acute severe profuse
liquid diarrhoea, nausea. She vomited six times, had
abdominal pain and a temperature of 37.4C. For a
fortnight she had had close contact, wearing full PPE,
with an EVD patient who had diarrhoea and
haemorrhage. Very nauseated and anxious in flight, her
temperature was 37.6C. The rapid diagnostic test for
malaria and initial RT-PCR thus 48 h were negative.
She left the CTS after a 72 h symptomatic treatment.
Case No. 4, worked as a hygienist in the ETC. He
presented fever to 39C, severe listlessness, profuse
sweating, vomiting and abdominal pain. He had worked
in full PPE, including handling contaminated wastes for
destruction in the incinerator. He did not take malaria
prophylaxis but slept under a mosquito net. In flight,
we noticed asthenia and drowsiness [Table 1]. Tests
performed in N’Zerekore revealed a negative RT—PCR
for Ebola with positive rapid test of malaria (HRP2).
After a second negative test RT-PCR at 48 h, he was
discharged from the CTS with anti-malarial treatment.
Support for cases 2, 3 and 4 was identical : isolation
and peripheral access with cristalloid infusion,
symptomatic oral or IV treatment; blood was taken for
biochemistry, rapid test for malaria (HRP2), RT—PCR
for Ebola, and blood electrolytes (I-Stat Chem 8 +
cartridges, Abbott Point of Care® Inc.).
Evacuation protocol
On the basis of a fever > 38.5C and a confirmed contact
with an EVD case, immediate evacuation to the CTS is
decided, without waiting for the results of the first RT-
PCR. The “HSTI-TCOL” is prepared near the aircraft
[Figs. 1 and 2]. The ambulance carrying the sick HW is
parked close to the stretcher. The patient is transferred
into the pod by two HWs in full PPE [Fig. 3a,b]. An IV
infusion line is threaded through a dedicated aperture in
the isolation pod, allowing the delivery of intravenous
fluids and medication to the patient if required in flight.
Before being loaded on the aircraft, and once the pod
has been sealed with the patient within, the outside is
sprayed with chlorine solution by staff in PPE. The air
depression system is checked before departure. Four
HWs ensure the stretcher installation in the aircraft.
The patient is not fastened inside but the pod is strongly
tied to four tie-down fittings inside the aircraft [Fig. 4].
All wastes carrying infectious risks are collected to be
incinerated. All the patient’s needs during the flight
are anticipated and placed inside the pod before the
door is closed.
The crew is composed of a pilot and a co-pilot, a doctor
and a nurse from the ETC. The flight altitude is 10500 ft
(3200 m); flight duration is 2 h by airplane and 4 h with a
refueling stop by helicopter, without pressurization. Full
PPE is provided on the plane for all crew members, in case
of unplanned pod failure. After landing in Conakry, the
patient is immediately transported and supported by the
CTS medical team, into the isolation area. The plane is
decontaminated using a chlorine solution at every point of
contact between the pod and the plane, which take about
Table 1 Patient and isolation pod parameters during transfer (Patient 4)
Time 17.15 17.20 17.40 18.25 18.50 19.25
Patient temperature (C) Take-off 37.2 37.5 36.9 Landing
Respiratory rate per minute 34 26 29 22
Level of consciousness Drowsy Alert Alert Alert
Glasgow Coma Scale 15 15 15 15
Internal temperature of the isolation pod (C) 35.8 32 26.6 22
Negative pressure of isolation pod (mmH2O) 4 4 3.5 4
Hygrometry inside the isolation pod 41
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15 min. At the end of the evacuation, when the patient’s
EVD status is known, if negative the pod is cleaned with a
chlorine solution; if positive the pod is incinerated, the
metal frame and the engine of the pod are strictly
decontaminated.
Technical features of the HSTI—TCOL
The size is 2300 mm L x 800 mm W x 1100 H mm,
and the weight is 45 kg. It includes a stretcher, 4 grips,
a transparent PVC envelope with 8 gloves attached to a
metallic frame, a filtration and depression engine with
2 high efficiency particulate air filters (HEPA—H14,
certified efficiency of 99.997%), a manometer, a therm-
ometer and a hygrometer. The air depression device
works with an electric engine powered by two 12 V bat-
teries and generates a depression between 2 and 5 mm
of water. Batteries life is about 6 h. Ambient air pene-
trates through the filter attached outside the pod. Viti-
ated air is eliminated by a second filter screwed inside.
Air renewal is 20–30 volumes per hour. A heavier ver-
sion (112 kg), the Vickers Aircraft Transport Isolator
(VATI), is also available but it can only be used in cargo
Fig. 1 Cessna 208 Caravan F-OJCC used for the evacuation of patients
2, 3 and 4
Fig. 2 The isolation pod HSTI-TCOL is prepared on the airstrip close
to the aircraft
Fig. 3 a & b The patient is loaded into the isolation pod by assistants
wearing full. Personal Protective Equipment
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planes and it needs 8 to 11 HWs for implementation
[7, 8].
Discussion
The first aeromedical evacuations for suspected lethal
infectious diseases were performed in the 1970s for pa-
tients with Lassa fever [9]. At the same time, closed sys-
tem isolators were developed to manage the risk of
secondary infection of health and transport staff in-
volved in the evacuation [7, 8, 10].
Under the evacuation protocol, once an evacuation
had been agreed, ETC contacted the CTS, and together
they co-ordinated with the World Food Program, to
evacuate patients to Conakry. The cost of the evacua-
tions (estimated at US$4000 per hour or about
US$20,000 for the round trip from Conakry) was met
from various sources including UN, EU and the French
government. Due to the delays in obtaining the initial
RT-PCR results in N’Zerekore, the desire to move pa-
tients before they deteriorated and became unfit for
evacuation [6], and the fact that the evacuation aircraft
operated only during daylight hours, the decision to
evacuate all four patients was made early in their illness,
based on high-risk exposure to EVD and symptoms
compatible with EVD. Step by step evacuation protocols
were issued to all logistic and medical staff during their
briefings for work in the ETC [11]. There were 3 isola-
tion pods available in Guinea; one in N’Zerekore, one
with MSF in Conakry and one with the UN.
HSTI-TCOL small height and weight offers great advan-
tage when used on a helicopter or a light aircraft as «
CESSNA CARAVAN ». The assembly of the pod is fast
and easy which allows being quickly operational. The size
of this pod is also very suitable for the road transfer in a 4
wheel drive vehicle to the airport before aerial evacuation.
In addition, the number of PPE dressed people needed for
preparing the patient and the transfer is lower than for the
heavier version of the pod, « VATI » that weighs 112 kg
and double the amount of staff needed. Finally, this
stretcher allows a closed monitoring of the patients.
But the pod has also a few disadvantages. First, the pa-
tient in the pod is not tied and that can be dangerous in
case of in-flight turbulences. Secondly, due to the limita-
tions of medical care possible in the cramped conditions
during transport, the patient has to be stable, conscious
and not agitated, without haemodynamic or respiratory
disturbance. Once the pod is sealed, there is no further ac-
cess without breaching infection control. Thus if a patient
deteriorates in-flight, intervention was limited to IV rehy-
dration, anti-emetics and IV sedation. Only patients well
enough to survive transport should be evacuated. Internal
temperature drops considerably during flight due to the
altitude and lack of cabin heating [Table 1]. This highlights
the need for an early decision to evacuate a patient with
symptoms compatible with EVD, to minimize the risk of
in-flight deterioration.
Conclusions
The establishment in West Africa of ETCs in the struggle
against the current EVD epidemic exposes health profes-
sionals to the risk of being infected by the virus. In
Guinea, a treatment center dedicated exclusively to HW
providing treatment to health care workers with possible
EVD patients was opened by the French Government.
The major ETCs in Guinea had access to HSTI-TCOL iso-
lation pods to allow HW patients to be transported by air.
The N’Zerekore ETC used the isolation pod and air trans-
port to evacuate HW suspected of having EVD, to the
CTS in Conakry. Air evacuations using the pod require
that the patient does not have critical dysfunction of any
major organ system which might cause deterioration in
flight. Clinicians require agreed transport protocols and
close co-ordination between the numerous groups in-
volved [12, 13]. These 4 evacuations, though ultimately
not involving any EVD patients, allowed the service to test
its protocols and equipment, notably the HSTI-TCOL iso-
lation pod. Thanks to effective communication and coord-
ination between the different services, the 4 HWs
suspected of having EVD were evacuated by air without
breach of biosafety precautions.
Fig. 4 The isolation pod is attached to the floor of the aircraft
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